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INTRODUCTION

The worldwide income tax reform movement of the 1980s is one
of the major changes in the political, social and economic aspects of
governmental budget functions.' From an historical perspective, it is
the third most important fiscal change in the last half century after:
1) the increase of income tax rates (especially during the 1940s because
of World War 11)2 and 2) the worldwide introduction of the Value

1. See, e.g., J. PECHMAN, WORLD TAX REFORM: A PROGRESS REPORT (1988); J.
PECHMAN, WORLD TAX REFORM (1987); Cumnnigham, Portuguese Tax Reform, 42 BULL. OF
INT'L BUREAU OF FISCAL DOCUMENTATION 78 (1988); Tanzi, Tax Reform in Industrial
Countries and the Impact of the U.S. Tax Reform Act of 1986, 42 BULL OF INT'L BUREAU
OF FISCAL DOCUMENTATION 65 (1988); Vanistendal, Trends of Tax Reform in Europe 5
AUSTRALIAN TAX FORUM 133 (1988); Viherkentata, An Examination of the International
Aspects of Finland'sNew ImputationSystem, 1 T.N.I. 349 (1989); Jenkins, Tax Reform: Lessons
Learned, Harvard Institute for InternationalDevelopment, paper No. 128 (Feb. 1989).
2. See e.g., Jones, Class Tax to Mass Tax: The Role of Propagandain the Expansion of
the Income Tax During World War 11, 37 BUFF. L. REV. 685 (1988).
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Added Tax (VAT). Initially, the VAT had been introduced in 1953,
3
in France, and had spread to most major countries.
The current tax reform movement includes, inter alia, a reduction
of individual and corporate income tax rates, the broadening of the
tax base, and a significant structural change in the taxation of the
corporation and shareholders by integrating the corporate and the
4
individual income tax.
Israel became a "member" of this movement through the "Mini
Tax Reform" of 1987. 5 This reform was a mini reform because it dealt
only with reduction of the highest brackets of individual and corporate
income tax. The recommendations of a public committee, set up by
the government in order to restore the redistributive effects of the
mini tax reform, have not been adopted by the government. The
central recommendations dealt with the reduction of the tax burden
on the low and middle class taxpayers by reducing their tax brackets
and broadening the tax base. Unfortunately, the restructuring of the
relation between the individual and corporate income tax had not been
on the fiscal, social or economic agenda. Therefore, the public committee did not search and recommend on the complicated issue of taxing
retained and distributed corporate source income. But now, the policy
makers are facing this issue and have it on the top of the agenda.
The Israeli model of taxation of corporations and of shareholders
is based on a partial integration model (PIM). The Israeli PIM has
two components which create the partial integration: 1) the reduced
tax at the corporate level on distributed and retained earnings; and
2) the split tax rate on dividends at the shareholders level.
The individual tax rates structure is progressive, and since the
"Mini Tax Reform of 1987" the individual tax rates on ordinary income
and on capital gains are the same: 35%, 45% and 48%.6 Income from
personal exertion 7 has two additional brackets: 20% and 30%.

3. A. TAIT, VALUE ADDED TAX 3 (I.M.F 1989).
4. J. PECHMAN, supra note 1, at 262, 272.
5. Income Tax Ordinance Amendment Law (No. 75), 5757 1987. For a comparison of the
1987 mini tax reform with the previous tax regime, including the distributive effects, see
Gliksberg, The 1987 Mini Tax Reform, Taxation of Corporations and Shareholders and ,the
Integration Model, 19 MISHPATIM HEBREW U. L. REV - t1989).
6. Income Tax Ordinance, 1961, § 121(a) (1961). Before the 1987 Mini Tax Reform the rates
were: 35%, 45%, 50% and 60%.
7. Id. at § 121(b). The concept of 'income from personal exertion" is very similar to the
U.S. concept of "earned income" (I.R.C. § 32(c)(2)).
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TAXATION OF THE CORPORATION

Taxes at the corporate level include the company tax and the
income tax. The company tax is a flat tax of 40% s and the income tax
is also a flat tax of 8.33%. 9 The purpose of the two types of tax is to
create a tax regime of partial integration and also impose different
tax burdens on distributed profits as opposed to undistributed profits.
A.

The Company Tax

The base of the company tax is very similar to the tax base of the
individual income tax. 10 The central feature of this tax base is the
exclusion of dividends received from the corporation" which is under
the company tax jurisdiction. Thus, intercorporate dividends are
excluded from the company tax as long as the distributing corporation
is under the company tax jurisdiction.
B.

The Income Tax
1. In General

In addition to the company tax, income tax is imposed on the
income of the corporation at the rate of 8-1/3%. In the calculation of
taxable income for corporate income tax purposes, these items are
deductible: 1) company tax paid on the same income; and 2) dividends
paid in the tax year from income which is liable to income tax. The
deduction is allowable only if the distributing corporation is an Israeli
resident.
Under the deduction's treatment of dividends, intercorporate dividends are taxable income for corporate level income tax purposes,
unless the corporation distributes them to its shareholders. After the
distribution of the dividends to the individual shareholders, there is
a complete exemption of income tax and company tax on intercorporate
dividends.

8. Id. at § 126(b).
9. Id. at § 127(a).
10. E.g., tax relief under the Law Encouragement of Industry (Taxes), 5729-1969, applies
only to corporations.
11. Income Tax Ordinance, supra note 6, at § 126. For simplification purposes, there is no
requirement for holding a specific amount of shares in the subsidiary. Id. The discussion ignores
the capital gains tax by assuming that the present value of the taxation on the retained profits,
through the capital gains tax, is zero because the inflationary capital gains are under a tax rate
of 10% only; most of the Israeli individuals have a capital gains tax exemption on realization of
securities traded in the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange and Israeli securities traded in major stock
exchange in the world, and a capital gains tax of 10% is levied on the capital gains component
that reflects retained earnings.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol5/iss3/2
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2. The Intertemporal Issue
If during the tax year in which a dividend was distributed, it could
not be deducted, either in whole or in part, because the income was
not taxable, or because this income was smaller than the dividend
which is deductible, then there is a carry-back system.' 2 The excess
dividend is considered as a deduction from the taxable income in the
first year prior to the tax year in which the dividend was paid; and,
as far as it cannot be deducted as above, it may be deducted from
13
taxable income in the preceding years.
C.

The Combined Tax Burden

The combined tax burden at the corporate level is illustrated in
Table 1 which sets forth three situations with the same corporate
source of income of $100, and a different dividend payout ratio.
TABLE 1
THE TOTAL TAXES ON CORPORATE SOURCE INCOME
(EXCEPT DIVIDEND AT THE CORPORATE LEVEL)
Corporate Source Income
Dividend Payout Ratio (Percentage)
Company Tax
Income Tax
Total Taxes

100
0
40
5
45

100
50
40
2.5
42.5

100
100
40
0
0

The Israeli tax model allocates relief at the corporate level and at
the shareholder level. At the first level the "split - rate" treatment
reduces the double taxation effect. Distributed profits have a reduced
tax burden (40%) compared with the tax burden on undistributed
earnings (45%).
Table 2 sets forth the total taxes at the corporate level on intercorporate dividends distributed by a corporation liable to company tax.
These two tables reflect two aspects of the Israeli's PIM: (1) the
total corporate level tax rate is lower than the highest individual tax
rate; 14 and (2) the deductibility of the dividend for corporate level income tax purposes but not for company tax purposes. This "partial"
dividend deduction creates a partial integration.

12. Id. at § 127(c).
13. The refund of the corporate level income tax carries index differentials plus real interest,
but only from the end of the year in which the distribution occurred.
14. The highest individual tax bracket is 48%.
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TABLE 2
THE TOTAL TAXES ON INTERCORPORATE DIVIDEND
AT THE CORPORATE LEVEL
Intercorporate Dividend
Dividend Payout Ratio (Percentage)
Company Tax
Income Tax (8-1/3%)
Total Taxes

60
0
0
5
5

60
50
0
2.5
2.5

60
100
0
0
0

Such a double tax structure (namely the income tax and the company tax at the corporate level) complicates the tax regime even under
the traditional Israeli view of preferring PIM to full integration. The
current tax results, at the corporate level, are achievable by various
tax alternatives based on one tax structure. The main alternatives
are: the partial dividend deduction method, the partial tax credit
method and the split rate method. For example, under a partial dividend deduction treatment, the rate of the corporate income tax, on
distributed profits and retained profits, would be 45% and the dividend
deduction would be designed to decrease it to 40%.1-1
III.

TAXATION OF SHAREHOLDERS

Taxation of dividends, at the shareholder level, is on a cash basis
16
without any imputation system. If the shareholder is a domestic
corporation, the income tax rate is 8-1/3%. If the shareholder is an
individual or a foreign7 corporation, then an income tax rate of 25%
is levied on the dividend.

15.

For the differences between these methods see R.

THEORY AND PRACTICE

397 (1984); M.

NORR,

MUSGRAVE,

PUBLIC FINANCE IN

THE TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND

83 (1982); J. PECHMAN, FEDERAL TAX POLICY 181 (1987); Warren, The
Relation and Integration of Individual and CorporateIncome Taxes, 94 HARV. L. REV. 719,
773 (1981). There are several tax systems which have two separate taxes, e.g., West Germany
and Italy levy a compensation tax, the "Erhoehungsbetrag" and the "Imposta di Conguaglio",
respectively, at the corporate level, but for other.reasons that relate to the corporate preference
issue, see, e.g., C. MCLURE, MUST CORPORATE INCOME .BE TAXED TWICE? 122-23 (1979);
J. PECHMAN, COMPARATIVE TAX SYSTEMS: EUROPE, CANADA, AND JAPAN 222 (1987); "Germany" in The Taxation of Companies in Europe (I.M.B.D., 1989); Avi-Yonah, The Treatment
of Corporate Preference Items under an Integrated Tax System: A Comparative Analysis
(unpublished draft, International Tax Program, Harvard Law School, 1989).
16. For the definition of a residence, see discussion parts VIII A.
17. A foreign corporation is a corporation which is not an Israeli resident, Income Tax
Ordinance, supra note 6, at § 1.
SHAREHOLDERS

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol5/iss3/2
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At the shareholder level the Israeli PIM is reflected through the
reduced tax rate of 25% which is lower than the lowest individual tax
rate of 35%.
IV.

TOTAL TAXATION OF CORPORATION AND SHAREHOLDERS

A.

In General

In Table 3, the combined tax consequences at the two levels (the
total tax) is shown in different dividend payout ratio positions. Because
of the absence of an imputation method of the retained earnings, the
focus will be on the tax consequences of the distributed profits.
TABLE 3
THE TOTAL TAX BURDEN (%)
Corporate Source Income
Dividend Payout Ratio (Percentages)
Individual Shareholder
Domestic Corporation Shareholder
Foreign Corporation

100
0
45
45
45

100
50
50
45
50

100
100
55
45
55

The general rule is that foreign corporations are treated the same
as Israeli individuals. Foreign corporations may be entitled to a lower
tax burden under the incentive regime.18
B.

The IntercorporateDividend Aspect

Table 3 shows that there is not a tax burden on intercorporate
dividends. There is however an additional tax burden of 10% on distribution of dividends from the corporate solution to the individual
solution. This additional burden is a result of a tax policy which intends
to encourage economic growth by retaining profits in the corporate
solution. The nontaxable distribution within the corporate solution is
limited to "national" moves from one Israeli corporation to another.
The dividend's arrival into the individual solution as well as the dividend's arrival into the foreign corporate solution imposes the additional tax burden on the distributed earnings.
C.

The Incentive Regime

Under the Law for Encouragement of Capital Investments, 57191959, an additional tax regime has been introduced in order to attract
foreign and domestic capital investments in Israel and to encourage
investments in certain preferred activities. Under the incentive tax

18.

See discussion on parts IV c & VIII c.
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regime the company tax at the corporate level is only 25%, and there
is no income tax at that level. The dividend is subject to an income
tax rate of 15% at the corporate level. Accordingly, the total tax
burden on the distributed income is only 36.25%19 as opposed to 55%.
Certain domestic corporations qualify for this regime, but they constitute a small percentage of all such corporationsO
V.

THE PROGRESSIVITY OF THE ISRAELI PARTIAL INTEGRATION
MODEL

A.

In General

The Israeli tax is imposed on corporate earnings at proportional
rates. The total tax burden on the retained earnings is levied at a
TABLE

421

Tax Brackets (%)
Dividend Payout
Ratio %

0

50

100

0

50

100

0

50

100

Corporate Source
Income

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

Corporate Taxes

45

42.5

40

45

42.5

40

45

42.5

40

Corporate Income
After Tax

55

57.5

60

55

57.5

60

55

57.5

60

Dividends

0

30

60

0

30

60

0

30

60

Individual Income
Tax

0

7.5

15

0

7.5

15

0

7.5

15

Total Tax

45

50

55

45

50

55

45

50

55

Upon Integration

35

35

35

45

45

45

48

48

48

Excess Burden (*)

10

15

20

0

5

10

-3

2

7

(*) Excess burden means the total income tax burden (at the corporate and individual levels)
minus the tax burden upon an integrated system, namely, the individual income tax brackets
(see Table 5).
19. 25% + (15% x 75%) = 36.25%.
20. The reason is that most of the economic activities under the incentive regime are
financed by foreign investors.
21. This table analyzes a pure domestic tax event. For international aspects see infra Table

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol5/iss3/2
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single rate of 45% and the total tax burden on the distributed earnings,
outside the domestic corporate solution, is imposed at a single rate of
55%.
B.

The Equity Issue

The proportional tax rate of 55% on distributed profits, as opposed
to the individual tax rate range, is undesirable because it distorts the
distributive function of the tax structure, from both vertical2 and
horizontal equity analyses:
1. The Vertical Inequity
a.

Vertical Inequity Among Shareholders

The return from equity is under a single tax rate, regardless of
income differences among shareholders.
b.

Vertical Inequity Among Creditors and Shareholders

Generally speaking, the Israeli income tax allows the deduction of
financial expenses. Therefore, an individual creditor might have a tax
liability which is lower than the shareholder's tax liability, even though
the financial income is higher than the dividend.
c.

Vertical Inequity Among Incorporate Investments and Noncorporate Investments

Return from noncorporate investment might bear tax liability
which is lower than the shareholder's tax liability even though this
return is higher than the dividend.
2. The Horizontal Inequity
a.

Horizontal Inequity Among Creditors and Shareholders

Creditors and shareholders have various tax burdens on the same
amount of income. Dividends bear tax liability that is higher than the
tax liability on the same amount of interest income because the deductibility of the interest expense avoids the corporate income tax level.
b.

Horizontal Inequity Among Incorporate Investments and Noncorporate
Investments

The tax liability on corporate investment returns is heavier than
the tax liability on the same amount of return from noncorporate
investments.
22. A vertical in this context means the vertical that is set up by the individual tax rate
progressivity.
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The Efficiency Issue
1. Debt v. Equity

Efficient corporate financing is achieved through economic considerations. Discrimination against the equity return, via the excess burden, encourages the financial use of debt from tax benefits. Efficient
allocation functioning requires fiscal neutrality, relating to debt and
equity finance which does not exist under the current system. This
bias against equity levies an additional cost regarding the intensive
and imaginary efforts of the taxpayers to substitute the equity by
debt. Preference for the debt creates an increased demand for debt
which raises the interest and inflation rates. The effect on the inflation
level is very crucial in Israel because of the dramatic reduction of
inflation from 445% in 1984 to the current annual level of 20% during
the last few years.
2.

The Distortion of the Noncorporate Investment's Preference

The reduced tax burden on noncorporate activity distorts the choice
of incorporating based on fiscal factors. In Israel, noncorporate business activity is a significant .sector in the economy and the excess
burden is a considerable distortion. Furthermore, noncorporate activity preference encourages high cost conversion from corporate investment return to noncorporate investment return.
D.

The "Special Corporations"

In order to overcome distributive shortcomings of the current Israeli PIM, Israel has introduced several tax treatments which replace
the partial integration, very generally, with the individual tax rate
structure.2 Those treatments generate many distortions, including
significant administrative costs. The following proposed imputation
system would eliminate the necessity for those treatments.
VI.

THE PROPOSED INTEGRATION SYSTEM

The current Israeli partial integration system has to be replaced,
because of the above defects, with a tax rate regime that eliminates

23. Those special tax treatments apply to "family corporations," Income Tax Ordinance,
supra note 6, at § 64A; "agricultural cooperatives," Income Tax Ordinance, supra note 6, at §
62; and "building corporations," Income Tax Ordinance, supra note 6, at § 64. There are two
major mechanisms in these tax treatments to apply the individual tax rate structure: the partnership method and the corporation with individual tax rate method. For the U.S. tax approach
on these mechanisms see, e.g., McGown & Joy, A Comparisonof Partnershipsand S Corporations After the Tax Reform of 1986, 33 ST. Louis U.L.J. 971 (1989).
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the excess tax burden on the corporate investment return. In theory,2
there are several alternatives to achieve that goal, but the only system
that has been introduced and functioned very well, in most major
industrial countries, is the imputation system. This system is based
on the gross up and shareholder tax credit on distributed corporate
earnings. It is desirable to impose, especially for collection reasons,
under the imputation system the highest individual tax rate as the
corporate income tax rate. The effects of the imputation system on
the current Israeli tax regime are shown in Table 5.
TABLE 5
THE IMPUTATION SYSTEM
Shareholders Tax Bracket (%)
Corporate Source Income
Corporate Income Tax
Dividend
Shareholder Grossed Up Income
Tax on Grossed Up Income
Shareholder Credit
Shareholder Tax Payment (Refund)
Shareholder Ultimate Tax

35
100
48
52
100
35
48
(13)
35

45
100
48
52
100
45
48
(3)
45

48
100
48
52
100
48
48
3
48

Under the imputation system there are three major issues that
should be considered: 1) the corporate preferences; 2) the international
aspects of the tax regime; and 3) the tax-exempt organizations.
The following analysis will focus on the first two issues and require
further detailed inquiries. The third issue is beyond the scope of this
paper because it has to do with the complicated tax regime of the
tax-exempt organizations.?
VII.

CORPORATE PREFERENCES

A.

In General

In general, the issue of corporate preference focuses on the desir26
able allocation of the corporate preference. The wash-out approach

24. See generally, C. MCLURE, supra note 15; M. NORR, supra note 15; Warren, supra
note 15; Gourevitch, Corporate Tax Integration: The European Experience, 31 TAX LAw. 65
(1975); Polito, A Proposalforan IntegratedIncome Tax, 12 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL. 1009 (1989).
25. For the aspect of the tax-exempt organizations see, e.g., C. MCLURE, supra note 15,
at 169-73, 235-40; Warren, supra note 15, at 787. It should be noted that the first two issues
are the most important elements for not changing the classical double taxation, e.g., the Netherlands case, see J. PECHMAN, supra note 15, at 9.
26. For the wash out mechanisms see C. MCLURE, supra note 15, at 99; Warren, supra
note 15, at 777; Avi-Yonah, supra note 15.
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allocates the corporate preference 27 at the corporate level, only in
order to encourage economic growth by the denial to pass through
the corporate preferences to the shareholder level. The other approach,
the so called "Pass-Through" (P.T.) approach, insists that the preference's purpose is the increase of the after tax return on the equity.
Therefore, the preference should be allocated by the P.T. mechanism
to the shareholders. In most tax regimes, any preference - even
without the legislative mechanism of P.T. - benefits the shareholders
by increasing the after tax corporate earnings. A full out treatment
requires an "Anti-P.T." mechanism that prevents the automatic P.T.
benefits from accruing to shareholders. Israel adopted a conservative
approach with three components:
1. In general, there is no comprehensive P.T. treatment. The
Israeli P.T. has a limited jurisdiction that include only two events
(P.T. events) which are described in the next paragraph.
2. There is no comprehensive wash-out treatment. Therefore, in
most of the cases, corporate preferences increase the Israeli integration through the "automatic P.T." mechanism.
3. In the P.T. events, most of the corporate preferences are passed through incompletely.
The "Pass-ThroughEvents"

B.

1. Dividends out of Preferred Income
In principle, the Ministry of Finance has been authorized,2 subject
to the Knesset Finance Committee's approval, to regulate that dividends paid by "certain kinds" of corporations out of "certain kinds"
of "preferred income" shall themselves be treated as "preferred income." The last concept means interest or dividends on which an
abatement or an exemption from tax was allowed under any enactment. This authority has been exercised in regulations within a very
limited jurisdiction, such that the pass-through treatment applies only
to dividends distributed by public investment corporations, the shares
of which are publicly traded on the Israeli Stock Exchange.2
2.

A Partial P.T. Mechanism

In addition to the above pass-through, the Israeli system 30 contains
a partial pass-through in relation to income with a special corporate
27. Under the Israeli tax law there are several substantial corporate tax preferences such
as accelerated depreciation.
28. Income Tax Ordinance, supra note 6, at § 13A.
29. Income Tax Order (Dividend from preferred income), 5724-1963.
30. Income Tax Ordinance, supra note 6, at § 128.
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level tax rate which has been legislated, but for which no breakdown
between company tax and income tax has been provided. The absences
of this division prevent the calculation of the total tax because the
amount of the corporate level income tax could not be calculated. The
legislative resolution to this problem is based on a formula that generates a partial pass-through in which the total tax is lower than the
"regular" total tax (which would result if there was no P.T. treatment)
but is higher than the special tax rate at the corporate level (which
would result if there was full P.T.). The jurisdiction of this mechanism
is considerably broader than the former one, but is still very narrow.
3. Evaluation of the Israeli P.T. Mechanism
The current Israeli P.T. model is very limited from three aspects:
(a) The jurisdiction of this mechanism is very narrow and does
not apply to most of the tax events in which the issue of corporate
preference is involved.
(b) Even under the P.T. jurisdiction, its depth is limited and
erodes the basic function of the P.T. - to pass through the corporate
preference to the shareholder level.
(c) There has not been designed a comprehensive tax policy toward the effects of the corporate preferences on the total tax burden
on corporate investment return. Except for the P.T. treatment on
dividends from preferred income (which applies to a very limited corporate preference and has been enacted under an articulate tax policy),
the rest of the tax effects of the P.T. or the wash out mechanisms
have not resulted from a comprehensive, articulate and accurate tax
policy. Such a policy would consider, for instance, various types of
corporate preferences.
4. The Desirable Treatment of Corporate Preference
The tax policy toward corporate preference includes these issues:
(1) the substantial issue - do we want to pass through the corporate
preference? and (2) the mechanism issue - what is the desirable
mechanism to eliminate or to apply the pass-through?
In these issues there are several approaches based on different
aspects of the subject. It is very difficult to decide which is the best
approach toward the corporate preferences, because every approach
has advantages and disadvantages. These issues require detailed research. In my opinion, very generally speaking, the desirable treatment is to allow pass through of the corporate preference, especially
those corporatepreferences that are also available to the noncorporate
activity. The implementation of a complete integration requires that
the tax regime should equalize the after tax return from the corporate
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and noncorporate sectors. A mixed system that passes through part
of the corporate preference and washes out the rest should not be
ruled out. This system would create a flexible and economic regime
by dividing the preferences to "pass-through preferences" and "washout preferences", based, inter alia, on the corporate preference's purpose, the availability of the preference to noncorporate activity and
administrative costs. In any event, there is a crucial necessity to
restructure the current tax regime relating to the substantial issue.
On the mechanism issue, there is a range of mechanisms with which
to introduce the pass-through treatment, and especially, the wash-out
treatment. On the pass-through side, a complete pass through of deduction or exempt income requires the imputation system (the gross
up and shareholder credit) to apply only on taxable income and the
exempt income should be passed through to the shareholder as tax
free distribution. 31 A tax credit should be passed through by applying
the regular integration system with a "constructive tax credit." In
other words, it assumes that the tax credit preference was paid by
the corporation.
It is much more complicated to point out what is the best wash
out system. In principle, there are four major systems: the Advance
Corporate Tax (the ACT), 32 the tracking of income,3 the tracking tax
payments,34 and the tracking of preference.- Again, this issue requires
a detailed discussion which is beyond the scope of this paper. In short,
it is recommended that there be a repeal of the current treatment,
and to adopt, basically, the ACT model with some adjustments in
order to overcome the shortcomings of the ACT. 36
VIII.

THE INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF THE ISRAELI PARTIAL
INTEGRATION MODEL

A.

In General

Israel has two separate international regimes: the so called "regular" regime, including international treaties for preventing double tax-

31.

C.

MCLURE,

supra note 15, at 96-99.

32. This approach was adopted by United Kingdom. See J. PECHMAN, supra note 15, at
304; Gourevitch, supra note 24, at 96.
33. France, West Germany and Italy had introduced the tracking of income approach. See
J. PECHMAN, supra note 15, at 164, 222; Avi-Yonah, supra note 15.
34. Australia and New Zealand adopted this regime, see J. PECHMAN, supra note 1, at 25
6; Avi-Yonah, supra note 15.
35. The tracking of preference system has been introduced by Japan, see Avi-Yonah, supra
note 15.
36. See generally, Warren, supra note 15, at 784.
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ation, and the incentive regime which has been introduced to encourage
foreign investments in Israel. The incentive regime generates substantial reduction of the tax burden and most of the foreign investments
are under this regime. Therefore, the incentive regime is the more
important component of the Israeli international jurisdiction.
Originally, based on the British approach, Israel adopted a source
jurisdiction. During the past three decades, however, many exceptions
have been legislated with a worldwide jurisdiction which is based on
residence.7
The source rules levy tax on income "accruing in, derived from or
'
received in Israel.
The I.T.O.39 defines the concept of "residence" in Israel as follows:
For an individual: an individual who resides in Israel
except for such temporary absences which to the assessing
officer may seem reasonable and not inconsistent with the
claim of such individual to be resident in Israel.
For a corporation: (1) A body of persons registered in
Israel whose main activities are carried out in Israel; provided that if it is registered as a foreign company it will be
deemed a resident of Israel only pursuant to its request;
upon the making of such a request, it shall be binding for a
period of three taxable years unless withdrawal is authorized
by the Minister of Finance.
(2) Any body of persons whose business' control and management are exercised in Israel.
A "non-resident" is defined 4 as "other than a personal resident in
Israel."
Under the residence jurisdiction, the worldwide business income
of corporations, which are controlled and managed in Israel, is liable
to Israeli taxation (the worldwide taxable income).41
B.

The Regular Regime

1. Foreign Shareholders of Domestic Corporations
The Israeli P.I.M., without the effect of the treaties for preventing
double taxation (the treaties), imposes a total tax of 55% on distributed
earnings. Therefore, from the international viewpoint, the individual

37.
38.
39.
40.

There are limited cases in which the worldwide jurisdiction is based on citizenship.
Income Tax Ordinance, supra note 6, at § 2.
Id. at § 1.
Id.
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domestic shareholder and the foreign shareholder are treated equally.
The regular regime is a non-discriminatory regime; namely, the tax
system does not discriminate between domestic investors at home and
foreign investors. The treaties do not substantially affect these tax
consequences.
Table 6 demonstrates the tax liability on Israeli source income
upon tax selected treaty countries.
Among these fourteen treaty countries, eight treaties impose the
same tax liability as it exists under the Israeli domestic law without
any treaties. Only one treaty gives a significant tax reduction of 27%42
off the regular tax liability. The rest of the treaties have granted a
limited relief of 10.9%.4
TABLE 6
THE TOTAL TAX IN SELECTED TREATY COUNTRIES
COUNTRY
Austria
Belgium
Canada
Denmark
Finland
France
Great Britain
Holland
Italy
Norway
Singapore
South Africa
Sweden
West Germany

TAX (%) ON
DIVIDENDS

TOTAL (%)
TAX (*)

25
15
15
25
25
25
15
15
25
25
exempt
25
15
25

55
49
49
55
55
55
49
49
55
55
40
55
49
55

(*) The total tax means the tax at the corporate level (40%) and the tax at the shareholders
level. For example, in the case of Belgium, the company tax at the corporate level is 40% and
the additional income tax at the shareholder level is 9% (60x15%).

2.

Foreign Income of Domestic Corporations
a.

In General
As previously mentioned, Israel levies income tax on the worldwide
income of the business corporation which meets the second component

41.
42.
43.

Id. at § 5(1).
(55-40)/55 = 27%
(55-49)/55 = 10.9%
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of the definition of the corporate residence, namely, a corporation for
which the control and the management of its business is exercised in
Israel.
b.

The Foreign Tax Credit

Foreign tax credit is vested by Israeli law as unilateral relief for
foreign taxes of" non-treaty countries or through the treaties. The
structure of the unilateral foreign tax credit is somewhat 45 undeveloped, and its functions are limited compared with the U.S. foreign
tax credit.
The Israeli unilateral relief enables Israeli corporations to deduct
foreign tax against the Israeli tax on the same income, but without
refund. The effect of this treatment is the reduction of the Israeli tax
liability on foreign income to the lower of: 1) 25% on the "gross"
income (before the foreign taxation), and 2) 45% of the combined
foreign and Israeli taxes (the "45% option").
In addition, Israeli corporations are entitled to a credit for foreign
capital gains taxes paid in an amount not to exceed the Israeli capital
gains tax. It is reasonable to assume that the foreign tax rate is higher
than 20%; therefore, the "45% option" would be preferred to the "25%
option." The following analysis is based on this assumption.
The unilateral foreign tax credit system provides no relief with
respect to the domestic corporation's undistributed earnings - the
tax burden is 45%. But the origin of the income (domestic v. foreign)
affects the total tax on distributed income because the dividend is not
deductible against the foreign tax at the corporate level. Therefore,
for instance, if the foreign tax is 45%, then the total tax will be
58.75%,46 compared with a total tax of 45% on domestic distributed
profits. The range of the total tax on foreign distributed profits is
55%-58.75%, based on the ratio of the foreign tax to the tax burden
at the corporate level. 47 However, the small additional tax of 3.75%
means that the Israeli partial integration is still kept 4s in this situation
through the reduced tax rate on the dividend.

44. The treaty between Israel and the U.S. has been ratified only by the U.S.
45. It is a direct result from the dominant territorial jurisdiction..
46. 45% + 25% x (100-45) = 58.75%. The assumption in this analysis is that the foreign
tax rate is, at least, 5%, therefore the tax burden is to be 45%.
47. In a capital gains tax event the ratio of the foreign tax probably will be higher because
of the Israeli tax rate of 10% on inflationary capital gains.
48. Under the classic double taxation model the total tax burden should be 45% + 48%
(100-45) = 71.4%.
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TABLE 7
A COMPARISON OF THE TOTAL TAX PROGRESSIVITY ON
DOMESTIC INCOME AND ON FOREIGN INCOME
Tax Brackets (%)
Dividend Payout
Ratio %

0

50

100

0

50

100

0

50

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

Corporate Taxes
(Foreign & Domestic)

45

45

45

45

45

45

45

45

45

Corporate Income
After Tax

55

55

55

55

55

55

55

55

55

Dividends

0

27.5

55

0

27.5

55

0

27.5

55

Individual Income
Tax

0

6.8

13.7

0

6.8

13.7

0

6.8

13.7

Total Tax

45

51.8'

58.7

45

51.8

58.7

45

51.8

58.7

Total Upon
Integration

35

35

35

45

45

45

48

48

48

Domestic & Foreign
Excess Burden

10

16.8

23.7

0

6.8 13.70

--3

3.8

10.7

"Domestic" Excess
Burden (Table 4)

10

15

20

0

-3

2

7

Corporate Source
Foreign Income

3.

5

10

Domestic Income of Foreign Corporations

The tax liabilities of foreign corporations are based on the Israeli
source jurisdiction. The foreign corporations are under the same tax
regime as the domestic corporations, except that foreign corporations
are not entitled to the dividend deduction for corporate income tax
purposes. Therefore, the combined tax at the corporate level on distributed profits and undistributed profits is equal - 45%. The tax
liability of dividends paid by these foreign corporations is most uncertain because of the absence of a determinative test as to which dividends are to be classified as Israeli source income. The common approach is that this income is exempt from Israeli tax and this view is
supported by the prohibition of the dividend deduction at the corporate
level.
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol5/iss3/2
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C.

The Incentive Regime

Israel has adopted a comprehensive tax incentive system in order
to encourage foreign investments in Israel. Most foreign investments
are approved by the Israeli Investment Center as "approved enterprises ' 49 and are entitled to the benefits of the incentive regime.The most important tax incentive of the approved enterprise is
the reduced tax rates at both the corporate and the shareholder level. 51
The magnitude of the reduction is based upon the proportion of foreign
equity versus domestic equity in the approved enterprise (i.e., the
greater the proportion of foreign equity, the greater the incentive).
The incentive regime has two basic components: 1) if more than
25% of the approved enterprise's equity has been invested by foreign
residents in foreign currency, then the enterprise's taxable income is
subject to a Company Tax of 10%, 15%, 20% and 25%, based on the
magnitude of the foreign equity, and exempt from corporate level
income tax; and 2) the dividends from approved enterprise's taxable
income are subject to income tax of 15%.
D.

The Proposed Integration and InternationalAspects

The introduction of the imputation system - the gross up and
shareholder's tax credit mechanism - faces the international aspects.
Speaking very generally, the issue becomes complicated if the domestic
tax systems desire to generate: 1) capital export neutrality (C.E.N.)
between its investors at home and its investors abroad; and 2) capital
import neutrality (C.I.N.) or non-discrimination between its investors
at home and foreign investors.
The C.E.N. raises the issue of the creditability of the foreign tax,
paid by the corporation, for the Israeli shareholder tax liability's purpose. The C.I.N. raises the issue of the creditability of the Israeli
tax, paid by the corporation, for the foreign shareholder tax liability's
purpose. In general, these issues are beyond the scope of the current
article and need a detailed analysis, but it would be desirable to draw
the general directions. At first, it should be noted that Israel, as a

49. There are four types of preferred projets: "approved enterprise," "approved investment," "approved property and rental buildings," and "approved loan." The most common foreign
investment is classified, in practice, as an "approved enterprise." Therefore, the other investment
types are ignored in this article.
50. The approval of investment is based on several factors, e.g., the industrial component
of the project, the investment's contribution to the Israeli export and the regional location of
the investment.
51. For a detailed analysis of the additional incentives, see Gliksberg, The Israeli Tax Policy
Toward Foreign Investments (on file with the International Tax Program, Harvard Law School).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1990

19

Florida Journal FLORIDA
of International
Law, Vol. LAW
5, Iss.JOURNAL
3 [1990], Art. 2
INTERNATIONAL

[Vol. 5

TABLE 8
THE TOTAL TAX BURDEN IN THE INCENTIVE REGIME
THE FOREIGN
INVESTMENT
Dividend
Payout
Ratio

0-48%

0

50 100

49-73%

74-89%

0

0

50 100

90% +

50 100

0

50 100

Corporate

Source
Income

100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100

Company
Tax

25

25

25

20

20

20

15

15

15

10

10

10

Corporate
Income
After Tax

75

75

75

80

80

80

85

85

85

90

90

90

Dividends

0 37.5

75

0

40

80

0 42.5

85

0

45

90

Individual
Income
Tax (15%)

0

5.6 11.2

0

6

12

0 6.3 12.7

0 6.7 13.5

25 30.6 36.2

20

26

32

15 21.3 27.7

10 16.7 23.5

Total Tax

capital-importing country, has adopted a comprehensive tax incentive
regime. Therefore, the issue of C.I.N. applies only under the regular
regime and has limited application. This is because most of the inbound
investments are under the incentive regime that has preferred foreign
investments to Israeli domestic investments, even if they have been
invested in the same economic activities. Israeli investments in those
activities receive a significant set of tax incentives which is lower than
the foreign investment's tax incentives. Nevertheless, the Israeli
domestic investment's tax incentives are generating an erosion of the
C.I.N. principle.
Therefore, the above international issues have a limited application
under the current Israeli tax policy: does Israel have to introduce,
under the regular regime, a tax treatment that fits the C.I.N. and
C.E.N. principles? The designing of the tax policy in these particular
aspects has to focus on the C.E.N. side: does Israel have to be concerned about worldwide welfare, leading to the creditability of the
foreign tax for shareholder's tax credit purpose, or to follow the general approach of preferring maximization of the national welfare by
declining the C.E.N. principle?
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As mentioned above, these issues require further and detailed inquiry, but, at this stage, it should be sufficient to draw the following
guideline, based on the central approach of the European imputation
system: under domestic legislation, the foreign tax credit would not
be regarded as tax paid and the imputation's tax credit for the shareholder should not be extended to foreign shareholders. The reconstructing of the international effects of the said legislative approach
should be addressed by introducing a treaty tax regime that would
resolve these issues on a reciprocal basis.
IX.

CONCLUSION

The current regime of partial integration should be replaced by
the imputation system of integration, based on the gross up and the
shareholder's tax credit mechanism on distributed earnings. In the
past three decades, Israel has focused on the inflation adjustment of
the various taxes, especially the income tax. The result is that the
existence regime has not been restructured during this long period,
in contrast with the impressive worldwide development of integrated
tax regimes. Under historical and comparative analysis, the Israeli
partial integration system was, in many times, a reasonable system.
Now, after the development of several sophisticated integration systems, the Israeli system is considered an old approach that requires
several fundamental adjustments. After the drastic reduction of the
inflation rate and the successful operation of the comprehensive adjustment of the income tax to inflation, the issue of integration has been
placed at the top of the fiscal agenda. The integration system, which
I recommend in this paper, has to be introduced as soon as possible.
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